{"id":10150,"date":"2026-02-12T09:16:21","date_gmt":"2026-02-12T08:16:21","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.thinkingafrica.org\/V2\/?p=10150"},"modified":"2026-02-12T09:22:45","modified_gmt":"2026-02-12T08:22:45","slug":"insurrections-djihadistes-difficultes-guerre-asymetrique-sahel","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.thinkingafrica.org\/V2\/insurrections-djihadistes-difficultes-guerre-asymetrique-sahel\/","title":{"rendered":"Face aux insurrections djihadistes, les difficult\u00e9s d&rsquo;une guerre asym\u00e9trique aux Sahel"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>D\u2019origine ext\u00e9rieure, l\u2019insurrection jihadiste au Sahel s\u2019est endog\u00e9n\u00e9is\u00e9e et contr\u00f4le<br \/>\nd\u00e9sormais de vastes espaces qui \u00e9chappent aux Etats, o\u00f9 elle impose ses propres r\u00e8gles,<br \/>\ncombinant fondamentalisme coranique, all\u00e9geance et terreur, tout en progressant vers le Nord<br \/>\ndes pays c\u00f4tiers. Les interventions ext\u00e9rieures (Minusma et Barkhane surtout), auxquelles les<br \/>\ncoups d\u2019\u00e9tat militaires ont mis fin, n\u2019ont pas permis de remporter des succ\u00e8s probants ni<br \/>\nm\u00eame de freiner l\u2019expansion jihadiste. La capacit\u00e9 propre des arm\u00e9es nationales et des Etats \u00e0<br \/>\nremporter cette guerre asym\u00e9trique est donc d\u00e9cisive, mais se heurte \u00e0 divers obstacles,<br \/>\ncomme la corruption dans les arm\u00e9es et le reste des institutions \u00e9tatiques, les relations parfois<br \/>\nd\u00e9licates entre l&amp;#39;arm\u00e9e et la population, l\u2019absence de politique de s\u00e9curisation de ces derni\u00e8res<br \/>\net les d\u00e9rives ethnicistes des milices locales ou nationales.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>T\u00e9lecharger le PDF ici: <a href=\"https:\/\/www.thinkingafrica.org\/V2\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/note-danalyse-politique-121-fevrier-2026.pdf\">https:\/\/www.thinkingafrica.org\/V2\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/note-danalyse-politique-121-fevrier-2026.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n<div\n    class='wp-block-pdfp-pdf-poster  alignnone'\n    id='block-2'\n    data-attributes='{&quot;uniqueId&quot;:&quot;pdfp1&quot;,&quot;file&quot;:&quot;https:\\\/\\\/www.thinkingafrica.org\\\/V2\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2026\\\/02\\\/note-danalyse-politique-121-fevrier-2026.pdf&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;height&quot;:&quot;842px&quot;,&quot;width&quot;:&quot;100%&quot;,&quot;print&quot;:false,&quot;downloadButton&quot;:false,&quot;fullscreenButtonText&quot;:&quot;View Fullscreen&quot;,&quot;fullscreenButton&quot;:true,&quot;align&quot;:&quot;none&quot;,&quot;alignment&quot;:&quot;left&quot;,&quot;titleFontSize&quot;:&quot;16px&quot;,&quot;showName&quot;:false,&quot;onlyPDF&quot;:false,&quot;defaultBrowser&quot;:false,&quot;downloadButtonText&quot;:&quot;Download File&quot;,&quot;actionsPosition&quot;:&quot;top&quot;,&quot;newWindow&quot;:false,&quot;protect&quot;:false,&quot;thumbMenu&quot;:false,&quot;sidebarOpen&quot;:false,&quot;initialPage&quot;:0,&quot;alert&quot;:false,&quot;lastVersion&quot;:false,&quot;hrScroll&quot;:false,&quot;isHideRightToolbar&quot;:false,&quot;additional&quot;:{&quot;ID&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;Class&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;CSS&quot;:&quot;&quot;},&quot;adobeEmbedder&quot;:false,&quot;adobeOptions&quot;:{&quot;showDownloadPDF&quot;:true,&quot;showPrintPDF&quot;:true,&quot;showAnnotationTools&quot;:true,&quot;showFullScreen&quot;:false,&quot;embedMode&quot;:&quot;SIZED_CONTAINER&quot;},&quot;popupOptions&quot;:{&quot;enabled&quot;:false,&quot;triggerType&quot;:&quot;button&quot;,&quot;image&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;imagePdfIcon&quot;:true,&quot;imageHeight&quot;:&quot;200px&quot;,&quot;imageWidth&quot;:&quot;300px&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Open PDF&quot;,&quot;btnStyle&quot;:{&quot;background&quot;:&quot;#2271b1&quot;,&quot;color&quot;:&quot;#fff&quot;,&quot;fontSize&quot;:&quot;16px&quot;,&quot;padding&quot;:{&quot;top&quot;:10,&quot;right&quot;:20,&quot;bottom&quot;:10,&quot;left&quot;:10}}},&quot;popupBtnStyle&quot;:{&quot;background&quot;:&quot;#2271b1&quot;,&quot;color&quot;:&quot;#fff&quot;,&quot;padding&quot;:{&quot;top&quot;:10,&quot;right&quot;:20,&quot;bottom&quot;:10,&quot;left&quot;:10}},&quot;popupBtnText&quot;:&quot;Open Document&quot;,&quot;CSS&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;socialShare&quot;:{&quot;enabled&quot;:false,&quot;facebook&quot;:true,&quot;twitter&quot;:true,&quot;linkedin&quot;:true,&quot;pinterest&quot;:true,&quot;position&quot;:&quot;top&quot;},&quot;isPremium&quot;:false}'\n    style=\"text-align: left\">\n    \n        <iframe loading=\"lazy\" title=\"\" style=\"border:0;\" width=\"100%\" height=\"800px\" class=\"pdfp_unsupported_frame\" src=\"\/\/docs.google.com\/gview?embedded=true&url=https:\/\/www.thinkingafrica.org\/V2\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/note-danalyse-politique-121-fevrier-2026.pdf\"><\/iframe>\n\n    <\/div>\n\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>&nbsp; D\u2019origine ext\u00e9rieure, l\u2019insurrection jihadiste au Sahel s\u2019est endog\u00e9n\u00e9is\u00e9e et contr\u00f4le d\u00e9sormais de vastes espaces qui \u00e9chappent aux Etats, o\u00f9 elle impose ses propres r\u00e8gles, combinant fondamentalisme coranique, all\u00e9geance et terreur, tout en progressant vers le Nord des pays c\u00f4tiers. Les interventions ext\u00e9rieures (Minusma et Barkhane surtout), auxquelles les coups d\u2019\u00e9tat militaires ont mis fin, [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":15,"featured_media":10152,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[34],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-10150","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analyse-politique"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.4 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Face aux insurrections djihadistes, les difficult\u00e9s d&#039;une guerre asym\u00e9trique aux Sahel - Thinking Africa<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.thinkingafrica.org\/V2\/insurrections-djihadistes-difficultes-guerre-asymetrique-sahel\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"fr_FR\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Face aux insurrections djihadistes, les difficult\u00e9s d&#039;une guerre asym\u00e9trique aux Sahel - Thinking Africa\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"&nbsp; D\u2019origine ext\u00e9rieure, l\u2019insurrection jihadiste au Sahel s\u2019est endog\u00e9n\u00e9is\u00e9e et contr\u00f4le d\u00e9sormais de vastes espaces qui \u00e9chappent aux Etats, o\u00f9 elle impose ses propres r\u00e8gles, combinant fondamentalisme coranique, all\u00e9geance et terreur, tout en progressant vers le Nord des pays c\u00f4tiers. 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