{"id":10195,"date":"2026-03-29T20:06:34","date_gmt":"2026-03-29T18:06:34","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.thinkingafrica.org\/V2\/?p=10195"},"modified":"2026-03-29T20:07:42","modified_gmt":"2026-03-29T18:07:42","slug":"manipulation-linformation-destabilisation-etats-sahel-burkina-faso-mali","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.thinkingafrica.org\/V2\/manipulation-linformation-destabilisation-etats-sahel-burkina-faso-mali\/","title":{"rendered":"Manipulation de l&rsquo;information et d\u00e9stabilisation des \u00c9tats du Sahel : cas du Burkina Faso et du Mali"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>La crise s\u00e9curitaire et politique a gravement fragilis\u00e9 l&rsquo;\u00c9tat au Mali et au Burkina Faso. Ces pays sont engag\u00e9s dans une guerre asym\u00e9trique, o\u00f9 la manipulation de l\u2019information joue un r\u00f4le pr\u00e9pond\u00e9rant. Cette note interroge les dynamiques d\u2019adaptation de la communication des acteurs\u00a0 \u00e0 travers le prisme de l&rsquo;infoguerre ou guerre informationnelle, en examinant les implications socio-politiques et les d\u00e9fis s\u00e9curitaires. L\u2019\u00e9tude a \u00e9tabli que la manipulation de l\u2019information exacerbe les conflits communautaires, notamment ceux impliquant les Peuls au Mali et au Burkina Faso. Par ailleurs, la d\u00e9sinformation se r\u00e9v\u00e8le \u00eatre un facteur d\u00e9mobilisateur pour les \u00e9lecteurs. Enfin, il est \u00e0 noter que les groupes arm\u00e9s produisent et diffusent de fausses informations \u00e0 travers les m\u00e9dias, en particulier sur les r\u00e9seaux sociaux, dans le but de l\u00e9gitimer leurs positions et de discr\u00e9diter l\u2019arm\u00e9e ainsi que le pouvoir central aux yeux de la population.<\/p>\n<p>T\u00e9l\u00e9charger votre pdf ici: <a href=\"https:\/\/www.thinkingafrica.org\/V2\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/Manipulation-de-linformation-et-destabilisation-des-Etats.pdf\">https:\/\/www.thinkingafrica.org\/V2\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/Manipulation-de-linformation-et-destabilisation-des-Etats.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n\n<div\n    class='wp-block-pdfp-pdf-poster  alignnone'\n    id='block-2'\n    data-attributes='{&quot;uniqueId&quot;:&quot;pdfp1&quot;,&quot;file&quot;:&quot;https:\\\/\\\/www.thinkingafrica.org\\\/V2\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2026\\\/03\\\/Manipulation-de-linformation-et-destabilisation-des-Etats.pdf&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;height&quot;:&quot;842px&quot;,&quot;width&quot;:&quot;100%&quot;,&quot;print&quot;:false,&quot;downloadButton&quot;:false,&quot;fullscreenButtonText&quot;:&quot;View Fullscreen&quot;,&quot;fullscreenButton&quot;:true,&quot;align&quot;:&quot;none&quot;,&quot;alignment&quot;:&quot;left&quot;,&quot;titleFontSize&quot;:&quot;16px&quot;,&quot;showName&quot;:false,&quot;onlyPDF&quot;:false,&quot;defaultBrowser&quot;:false,&quot;downloadButtonText&quot;:&quot;Download File&quot;,&quot;actionsPosition&quot;:&quot;top&quot;,&quot;newWindow&quot;:false,&quot;protect&quot;:false,&quot;thumbMenu&quot;:false,&quot;sidebarOpen&quot;:false,&quot;initialPage&quot;:0,&quot;alert&quot;:false,&quot;lastVersion&quot;:false,&quot;hrScroll&quot;:false,&quot;isHideRightToolbar&quot;:false,&quot;additional&quot;:{&quot;ID&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;Class&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;CSS&quot;:&quot;&quot;},&quot;adobeEmbedder&quot;:false,&quot;adobeOptions&quot;:{&quot;showDownloadPDF&quot;:true,&quot;showPrintPDF&quot;:true,&quot;showAnnotationTools&quot;:true,&quot;showFullScreen&quot;:false,&quot;embedMode&quot;:&quot;SIZED_CONTAINER&quot;},&quot;popupOptions&quot;:{&quot;enabled&quot;:false,&quot;triggerType&quot;:&quot;button&quot;,&quot;image&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;imagePdfIcon&quot;:true,&quot;imageHeight&quot;:&quot;200px&quot;,&quot;imageWidth&quot;:&quot;300px&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Open PDF&quot;,&quot;btnStyle&quot;:{&quot;background&quot;:&quot;#2271b1&quot;,&quot;color&quot;:&quot;#fff&quot;,&quot;fontSize&quot;:&quot;16px&quot;,&quot;padding&quot;:{&quot;top&quot;:10,&quot;right&quot;:20,&quot;bottom&quot;:10,&quot;left&quot;:10}}},&quot;popupBtnStyle&quot;:{&quot;background&quot;:&quot;#2271b1&quot;,&quot;color&quot;:&quot;#fff&quot;,&quot;padding&quot;:{&quot;top&quot;:10,&quot;right&quot;:20,&quot;bottom&quot;:10,&quot;left&quot;:10}},&quot;popupBtnText&quot;:&quot;Open Document&quot;,&quot;CSS&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;socialShare&quot;:{&quot;enabled&quot;:false,&quot;facebook&quot;:true,&quot;twitter&quot;:true,&quot;linkedin&quot;:true,&quot;pinterest&quot;:true,&quot;position&quot;:&quot;top&quot;},&quot;isPremium&quot;:false}'\n    style=\"text-align: left\">\n    \n        <iframe loading=\"lazy\" title=\"\" style=\"border:0;\" width=\"100%\" height=\"800px\" class=\"pdfp_unsupported_frame\" src=\"\/\/docs.google.com\/gview?embedded=true&url=https:\/\/www.thinkingafrica.org\/V2\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/Manipulation-de-linformation-et-destabilisation-des-Etats.pdf\"><\/iframe>\n\n    <\/div>\n\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>La crise s\u00e9curitaire et politique a gravement fragilis\u00e9 l&rsquo;\u00c9tat au Mali et au Burkina Faso. Ces pays sont engag\u00e9s dans une guerre asym\u00e9trique, o\u00f9 la manipulation de l\u2019information joue un r\u00f4le pr\u00e9pond\u00e9rant. Cette note interroge les dynamiques d\u2019adaptation de la communication des acteurs\u00a0 \u00e0 travers le prisme de l&rsquo;infoguerre ou guerre informationnelle, en examinant les [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":15,"featured_media":10197,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[34],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-10195","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analyse-politique"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.4 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Manipulation de l&#039;information et d\u00e9stabilisation des \u00c9tats du Sahel : cas du Burkina Faso et du Mali - Thinking Africa<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.thinkingafrica.org\/V2\/manipulation-linformation-destabilisation-etats-sahel-burkina-faso-mali\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"fr_FR\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Manipulation de l&#039;information et d\u00e9stabilisation des \u00c9tats du Sahel : cas du Burkina Faso et du Mali - Thinking Africa\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"La crise s\u00e9curitaire et politique a gravement fragilis\u00e9 l&rsquo;\u00c9tat au Mali et au Burkina Faso. Ces pays sont engag\u00e9s dans une guerre asym\u00e9trique, o\u00f9 la manipulation de l\u2019information joue un r\u00f4le pr\u00e9pond\u00e9rant. Cette note interroge les dynamiques d\u2019adaptation de la communication des acteurs\u00a0 \u00e0 travers le prisme de l&rsquo;infoguerre ou guerre informationnelle, en examinant les [&hellip;]\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.thinkingafrica.org\/V2\/manipulation-linformation-destabilisation-etats-sahel-burkina-faso-mali\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Thinking Africa\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2026-03-29T18:06:34+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2026-03-29T18:07:42+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/www.thinkingafrica.org\/V2\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/Gemini_Generated_Image_btl5vbbtl5vbbtl5-1024x442.png\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"1024\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"442\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/png\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Domoina RAZAFINDRAZAKA\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"\u00c9crit par\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Domoina RAZAFINDRAZAKA\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Dur\u00e9e de lecture estim\u00e9e\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"1 minute\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.thinkingafrica.org\\\/V2\\\/manipulation-linformation-destabilisation-etats-sahel-burkina-faso-mali\\\/#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.thinkingafrica.org\\\/V2\\\/manipulation-linformation-destabilisation-etats-sahel-burkina-faso-mali\\\/\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Domoina RAZAFINDRAZAKA\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.thinkingafrica.org\\\/V2\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/1af5d63bd05adb39fe95cad479bc04f5\"},\"headline\":\"Manipulation de l&rsquo;information et d\u00e9stabilisation des \u00c9tats du Sahel : cas du Burkina Faso et du Mali\",\"datePublished\":\"2026-03-29T18:06:34+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2026-03-29T18:07:42+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.thinkingafrica.org\\\/V2\\\/manipulation-linformation-destabilisation-etats-sahel-burkina-faso-mali\\\/\"},\"wordCount\":208,\"commentCount\":0,\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.thinkingafrica.org\\\/V2\\\/manipulation-linformation-destabilisation-etats-sahel-burkina-faso-mali\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.thinkingafrica.org\\\/V2\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2026\\\/03\\\/Gemini_Generated_Image_btl5vbbtl5vbbtl5-scaled.png\",\"articleSection\":[\"Note d'analyse politique\"],\"inLanguage\":\"fr-FR\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.thinkingafrica.org\\\/V2\\\/manipulation-linformation-destabilisation-etats-sahel-burkina-faso-mali\\\/#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.thinkingafrica.org\\\/V2\\\/manipulation-linformation-destabilisation-etats-sahel-burkina-faso-mali\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.thinkingafrica.org\\\/V2\\\/manipulation-linformation-destabilisation-etats-sahel-burkina-faso-mali\\\/\",\"name\":\"Manipulation de l'information et d\u00e9stabilisation des \u00c9tats du Sahel : cas du Burkina Faso et du Mali - 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