{"id":9319,"date":"2022-10-23T20:47:36","date_gmt":"2022-10-23T18:47:36","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.thinkingafrica.org\/V2\/?p=9319"},"modified":"2022-10-23T20:53:40","modified_gmt":"2022-10-23T18:53:40","slug":"la-deterioration-des-services-sociaux-de-base-dans-les-zones-sous-occupation-djihadiste-lexemple-du-mali-n-os-oif-05","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.thinkingafrica.org\/V2\/la-deterioration-des-services-sociaux-de-base-dans-les-zones-sous-occupation-djihadiste-lexemple-du-mali-n-os-oif-05\/","title":{"rendered":"La d\u00e9t\u00e9rioration des services sociaux de base dans les zones sous occupation djihadiste &#8211; l\u2019exemple du Mali N\u00b0 OS &#8211; OIF 05"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Depuis 2012, le Mali connait une forte crise s\u00e9curitaire qui a des cons\u00e9quences politique, sociale et \u00e9conomique. Cette crise a d\u2019abord commenc\u00e9 par les attaques du camp de Aguelhok en janvier 2012 par le Mouvement National de Lib\u00e9ration de l\u2019Azawad (MNLA) \u2013 mouvement ind\u00e9pendantiste \u2013 qui s\u2019\u00e9tait alli\u00e9 avec les mouvements terroristes comme <em>Ansar Dine <\/em>(les partisans de la religion en arabe), <em>Al Qa\u00efda<\/em> Maghreb Islamique (AQMI) et des narcotrafiquants qui op\u00e8rent dans le septentrion malien depuis le d\u00e9but des ann\u00e9es 2000. L\u2019arm\u00e9e, pr\u00e9textant l\u2019incapacit\u00e9 du pr\u00e9sident Amadou Toumani Tour\u00e9 (ATT) \u00e0 faire face \u00e0 la crise du Nord, renverse ce dernier en mars 2012 (troisi\u00e8me coup d\u2019Etat au Mali)<a href=\"#_ftn1\" name=\"_ftnref1\">[1]<\/a>. Ce coup d\u2019Etat a bris\u00e9 la cha\u00eene de commandement de l\u2019arm\u00e9e, avec l\u2019arr\u00eat des officiers militaires ou le rappel de ceux qui sont sur le front, d\u2019autant plus que c\u2019est un coup d\u2019Etat de sous-officiers dirig\u00e9 alors par le capitaine Amadou H. Sanogo. Les militaires maliens d\u00e9sertent successivement les r\u00e9gions de Kidal, de Tombouctou et de Gao. Les trois grandes r\u00e9gions du Mali (Gao, Tombouctou, Kidal) tomb\u00e8rent sous la coupe du MNLA et des groupes arm\u00e9s terroristes (GAT). S\u2019en suivirent donc pendant neuf \u00e0 dix mois, l\u2019application stricte de la loi islamique (la <em>Charia<\/em>), dans cette partie du pays, avec les premi\u00e8res lapidations pour adult\u00e8res ou les coupures de main pour vol. C\u2019est \u00e0 partir de cette date qu\u2019un autre groupe terroriste, le Mouvement pour l\u2019Unicit\u00e9 du Jihad en Afrique de l\u2019Ouest (MUJAO) fait son apparition. Une alliance se cr\u00e9\u00e9e entre ces diff\u00e9rents groupes terroristes qui occuperont le nord du Mali pendant presque un an.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref1\" name=\"_ftn1\">[1]<\/a> Le Mali a connu deux autres coups d\u2019Etats depuis cette date le 18 ao\u00fbt 2020 et le 21 mai 2021. C\u2019est une transition militaire qui est toujours en cours.<\/p>\n\n<div\n    class='wp-block-pdfp-pdf-poster  alignnone'\n    id='block-2'\n    data-attributes='{&quot;uniqueId&quot;:&quot;pdfp1&quot;,&quot;file&quot;:&quot;https:\\\/\\\/www.thinkingafrica.org\\\/V2\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2022\\\/10\\\/La-de\\u0301te\\u0301rioration-des-services-sociaux-de-base-dans-les-zones-sous-occupation-djihadiste-lexemple-du-Mali-N\\u00b0-OS-OIF-05-Note-danalyse-OS-TA.pdf&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;La d\\u00e9t\\u00e9rioration des services sociaux de base dans les zones sous occupation djihadiste &#8211; l\\u2019exemple du Mali N\\u00b0 OS &#8211; OIF 05&quot;,&quot;height&quot;:&quot;842px&quot;,&quot;width&quot;:&quot;100%&quot;,&quot;print&quot;:false,&quot;fullscreenButton&quot;:&quot;1&quot;,&quot;fullscreenButtonText&quot;:&quot;View Fullscreen&quot;,&quot;newWindow&quot;:false,&quot;showName&quot;:true,&quot;downloadButton&quot;:false,&quot;downloadButtonText&quot;:&quot;Download File&quot;,&quot;protect&quot;:false,&quot;onlyPDF&quot;:false,&quot;defaultBrowser&quot;:false,&quot;thumbMenu&quot;:false,&quot;initialPage&quot;:0,&quot;sidebarOpen&quot;:false,&quot;lastVersion&quot;:false,&quot;hrScroll&quot;:0,&quot;alert&quot;:true,&quot;btnStyles&quot;:{&quot;background&quot;:&quot;#1e73be&quot;,&quot;color&quot;:&quot;#fff&quot;,&quot;fontSize&quot;:&quot;1rem&quot;,&quot;padding&quot;:{&quot;top&quot;:10,&quot;right&quot;:20,&quot;bottom&quot;:10,&quot;left&quot;:10}},&quot;popupOptions&quot;:{&quot;enabled&quot;:0,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Open PDF&quot;,&quot;triggerType&quot;:&quot;button&quot;,&quot;image&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;imageHeight&quot;:&quot;200px&quot;,&quot;imageWidth&quot;:&quot;300px&quot;,&quot;imagePdfIcon&quot;:true,&quot;triggerAlignment&quot;:&quot;center&quot;,&quot;btnStyle&quot;:{&quot;background&quot;:&quot;#1e73be&quot;,&quot;color&quot;:&quot;#fff&quot;,&quot;fontSize&quot;:&quot;1rem&quot;,&quot;padding&quot;:{&quot;top&quot;:10,&quot;right&quot;:20,&quot;bottom&quot;:10,&quot;left&quot;:10}}},&quot;actionsPosition&quot;:&quot;top&quot;,&quot;socialShare&quot;:{&quot;enabled&quot;:false,&quot;facebook&quot;:false,&quot;twitter&quot;:false,&quot;linkedin&quot;:false,&quot;pinterest&quot;:false,&quot;position&quot;:&quot;top&quot;},&quot;adobeEmbedder&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:&quot;none&quot;,&quot;alignment&quot;:&quot;left&quot;,&quot;titleFontSize&quot;:&quot;16px&quot;,&quot;isHideRightToolbar&quot;:false,&quot;additional&quot;:{&quot;ID&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;Class&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;CSS&quot;:&quot;&quot;},&quot;adobeOptions&quot;:{&quot;showDownloadPDF&quot;:true,&quot;showPrintPDF&quot;:true,&quot;showAnnotationTools&quot;:true,&quot;showFullScreen&quot;:false,&quot;embedMode&quot;:&quot;SIZED_CONTAINER&quot;},&quot;popupBtnStyle&quot;:{&quot;background&quot;:&quot;#2271b1&quot;,&quot;color&quot;:&quot;#fff&quot;,&quot;padding&quot;:{&quot;top&quot;:10,&quot;right&quot;:20,&quot;bottom&quot;:10,&quot;left&quot;:10}},&quot;popupBtnText&quot;:&quot;Open Document&quot;,&quot;CSS&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;isPremium&quot;:false}'\n    style=\"text-align: left\">\n    \n        <iframe loading=\"lazy\" title=\"La d\u00e9t\u00e9rioration des services sociaux de base dans les zones sous occupation djihadiste &#8211; l\u2019exemple du Mali N\u00b0 OS &#8211; OIF 05\" style=\"border:0;\" width=\"100%\" height=\"800px\" class=\"pdfp_unsupported_frame\" src=\"\/\/docs.google.com\/gview?embedded=true&url=https:\/\/www.thinkingafrica.org\/V2\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/10\/La-de\u0301te\u0301rioration-des-services-sociaux-de-base-dans-les-zones-sous-occupation-djihadiste-lexemple-du-Mali-N\u00b0-OS-OIF-05-Note-danalyse-OS-TA.pdf\"><\/iframe>\n\n    <\/div>\n\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Depuis 2012, le Mali connait une forte crise s\u00e9curitaire qui a des cons\u00e9quences politique, sociale et \u00e9conomique. Cette crise a d\u2019abord commenc\u00e9 par les attaques du camp de Aguelhok en janvier 2012 par le Mouvement National de Lib\u00e9ration de l\u2019Azawad (MNLA) \u2013 mouvement ind\u00e9pendantiste \u2013 qui s\u2019\u00e9tait alli\u00e9 avec les mouvements terroristes comme Ansar Dine (les partisans de la religion en arabe), Al Qa\u00efda Maghreb Islamique (AQMI) et des narcotrafiquants qui op\u00e8rent dans le septentrion malien depuis le d\u00e9but des ann\u00e9es 2000. L\u2019arm\u00e9e, pr\u00e9textant l\u2019incapacit\u00e9 du pr\u00e9sident Amadou Toumani Tour\u00e9 (ATT) \u00e0 faire face \u00e0 la crise du Nord, renverse ce dernier en mars 2012 (troisi\u00e8me coup d\u2019Etat au Mali)[1].<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":15,"featured_media":9321,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[34],"tags":[814,811,817,818,101,819,812,813,816,815],"class_list":["post-9319","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analyse-politique","tag-base","tag-deterioration","tag-djihadiste","tag-exemple","tag-mali","tag-n-os-oif-05","tag-services","tag-sociaux","tag-sous-occupation","tag-zones"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.4 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>La d\u00e9t\u00e9rioration des services sociaux de base dans les zones sous occupation djihadiste - l\u2019exemple du Mali N\u00b0 OS - OIF 05 - Thinking Africa<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.thinkingafrica.org\/V2\/la-deterioration-des-services-sociaux-de-base-dans-les-zones-sous-occupation-djihadiste-lexemple-du-mali-n-os-oif-05\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"fr_FR\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"La d\u00e9t\u00e9rioration des services sociaux de base dans les zones sous occupation djihadiste - l\u2019exemple du Mali N\u00b0 OS - OIF 05 - Thinking Africa\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Depuis 2012, le Mali connait une forte crise s\u00e9curitaire qui a des cons\u00e9quences politique, sociale et \u00e9conomique. 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